



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

rich, on the other hand, must refrain from starting funds and charities, they must even refrain from giving to individuals except with caution and knowledge; but they must give freely towards all educational institutions and asylums for the afflicted.

But why, it may be objected, if the poor may give to each other without ill effects, may not the rich, or better still the state, give to the poor? In the one case the giving is done with difficulty and sacrifice; in the other no one feels any sacrifice at all. Chalmers gives no uncertain answer. It is just because of the sacrifice involved that the help of the poor is safe, and certain not to be abused. It will be given with full knowledge, it will be accepted only in real need. On the other hand when the source from which Charity flows is practically impersonal, there will be no moderation in the claims made upon it, and little wisdom in its bestowal.

One other point he presses as of ultimate importance; and that is the dissociation of alms-giving from the functions of the minister of religion. That does not imply that the church should abandon the work; his whole system was based upon the proper organization of the church parish. But until he had made it understood that he and his elders had broken off all connection with the charities, and handed over to his deacons the work of looking after the material needs of the parish, he found it impossible to make real progress with his spiritual ministry. At the present day, when ministers of all denominations insist so vehemently on their claims to be alms-givers as well as teachers, the opposite point of view should be seriously pressed. But for the actual account of Chalmers' work and its success, we must refer the reader to Mr. Masterman's book, and, if it can be obtained, to Chalmers' own book, "*On the Sufficiency of the Parochial System without a Poor Rate.*"

HELEN BOSANQUET.

SURREY, ENGLAND.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ, with an Appendix of leading passages. By Bertrand Russell. Cambridge: University Press, 1900. Pp. ix, 311.

Mr. Russell's book is decidedly one of the most important of recent contributions both to the history of philosophy and to philosophical criticism. It is by no means easy reading, but that

is less the fault of the author than of the subject. Of all the great philosophers of the seventeenth century, that most wonderful period of modern intellectual activity, Leibnitz is perhaps the most suggestive, and is certainly the one whose ideas are hardest to discover from the mere perusal of his published treatises. It was not until the publication of his correspondence with Antoine Arnauld and the little treatise on Metaphysics written for Arnauld's benefit that scholars came into possession of the materials upon which a proper understanding of the system of Monads has to be based. Mr. Russell's is, I believe, the first English work which is founded upon a minute study of this important material, and it may therefore be said, without any derogation from the merits of the excellent works of Mr. Merz and Prof. Latta, that Mr. Russell has for the first time enabled the English student to form a serious estimate of the value of the Leibnitian system as a philosophy of existence. The first and principal merit of the author, then, is by the use of material published within the sixty years since the appearance of Erdmann's edition, to have made it clear that the peculiar doctrines of the "Monadology" are really based upon a few general assumptions, partly logical, partly metaphysical, and in particular to have shown how intimately the Leibnitian theory of substance is connected with a doctrine of the nature of predication. Only second in importance to this examination of the logical foundation of the system are the discussions of Leibnitz's peculiar views of matter and force. Mr. Russell has the advantage, in treating of the Dynamics of Leibnitz, that he writes as a mathematician as well as a philosopher, which is more than can be said of some of his ablest predecessors. His examination, wherever it is intelligently followed, ought once for all to show how ambiguous was Leibnitz's use of fundamental dynamical terminology and how little connection there is between his contributions to dynamics and his metaphysical principles. The mere proof that "activity" and "force" mean different things to Leibnitz according as he is dealing with dynamical or with metaphysical problems, simple as it is, is by no means uncalled for, seeing that Leibnitz has constantly been rather unintelligently lauded for his confusions on this very topic. A third excellent feature of the book is the convincing way in which Mr. Russell brings out the fact, not in itself altogether novel, that all the better known parts of Leibnitz's doctrine, the theory of soul and body, the proofs of the existence of God, the

doctrine of sin, in a word everything by which he is best known to the general student, are simply "lifted" with a little toning down of unorthodox phraseology from Spinoza. Lessing's declaration, which Jacobi found such a paradox, that Leibnitz was at heart a Spinozist, was, in fact, absolutely justified by all that Lessing or Jacobi could know of Leibnitz. There are indeed important differences between the two philosophers, but those differences can scarcely be understood without a careful study of Leibnitz's writings for Arnauld, of which the world in Lessing's day knew nothing. Finally, in speaking of the general merits of Mr. Russell's book, it must be added that the Appendix of passages in illustration of Leibnitz's views will be found invaluable both by students and by teachers who do not possess or have not time to master in detail the six large volumes of Gerhardt's edition.

Coming to deal more particularly with some of the subjects enumerated, I must say something of what is, to my mind, the most important and original part of the book, the criticism of the logical foundations of Leibnitz's system. As an exposition of Leibnitz the first six chapters of the book cannot be too highly praised, but as a contribution to philosophical criticism the argument seems to be vitiated by a curious confusion. After pointing out, correctly, that Leibnitz's doctrine of substance is directly derived from the logical theory that all judgment consists in the ascription of a predicate to a subject, Mr. Russell goes on to identify this doctrine as held by Leibnitz with the position maintained in Mr. Bradley's "*Logic*," and to urge against both philosophers that propositions which assert relation, as also propositions which predicate number, cannot be reduced to the subject-attribute type. Now as against Leibnitz this contention is perfectly valid and hits one of the central defects of his thought. For Leibnitz it is essential to hold that all predications of relation can be successfully resolved into ascriptions of an attribute to a subject, or, in other words, that relations are all phenomenal of the qualities of substances. Unless this is so, the whole scheme of the "pre-established harmony" falls to pieces, and there is real "interaction." Again, Leibnitz, as his "proof of the existence of God," shows, regarded existence as an attribute, inconsistent as this no doubt is with the principle of his famous distinction between propositions of reason and propositions of matter of fact. But to ascribe either of these doctrines to Mr. Bradley is little

better than an *ignoratio elenchi*. No one has laid more stress than Mr. Bradley himself upon the impossibility of a simple reduction of judgments of relation to judgments of the subject-attribute type. Mr. Russell should have remembered that one of the chief defects alleged against the syllogism in "Principles of Logic" was precisely that it is confined by its traditional formulæ within the limits of the subject-attribute form of predication. Similarly the view taken in "Appearance and Reality" was that both *attributes* and *relations* are shown to be merely phenomenal by the very fact that, though we cannot devise any coherent doctrine as to the connection between these, neither can be successfully resolved into the other.\* So again, Mr. Bradley's definition of judgment as the ascription to reality of an ideal content is expressly devised to exclude that view of existence as an attribute which the "predicative," or as it should rather be styled, the "attributive" theory of judgment involves. Superficially alike in expression, the two theories of predication are really as far asunder as the poles. Leibnitz's doctrine is based upon the old conception of judgment as the affirmation of one "notion" about another which he shared with Locke and other philosophers of the time; the whole point of Mr. Bradley's doctrine, on the other hand, is that our affirmations are made not about a "subject-notion" directly or indirectly, but about *perceived* reality as a whole. Without discussing the relative merits of the two views, we may point out that while the first leads straight to monadism, the second at a blow knocks the bottom out of the monadist metaphysics. The doctrine of the unity of the ultimate subject in fact bars to monism the same relation that the doctrine of a plurality of subjects does to monadism. What view Mr. Russell himself takes of the ultimate nature of judgment it is difficult to discover. He can hardly hold that all attributes can be satisfactorily resolved into relations between terms which are themselves without qualities, though something of the kind seems to be implied in the statement that "this is red" is a judgment of relation (p. 15). Nor would it be fair to credit him with thoughtless acquiescence in the popular idea of attributes and relations as subsisting in some unexplained way side by side. He by implication rejects the notions of substance and of an "absolute," and yet nowhere definitely commits himself to mere Phenomenalism.

---

\*See "Principles of Logic," p. 241, ff. "Appearance and Reality," ch. 3.

Similarly it would be hard to say exactly what is, to his mind, the connection between truth and reference to real existence. That truth does not depend upon existence is definitely affirmed (p. 182), and the author consequently holds with Leibnitz that there can be whole systems of "eternal truths" which have no relation to the actually existent. But, like Leibnitz, Mr. Russell fails to make it clear how such mere possibilities are distinguished from the purely arbitrary, or how apart from some indirect relation to the actual perceived order of things possibility itself can have any meaning. To tell the truth, he seems to fall in his desire to avoid a "cheap and easy" identification of truth with fact into an equally cheap and easy denial of any connection between them. At any rate, until further explanation of his own logical position, Mr. Russell must not be surprised if the adherents of the "existential" doctrine of predication charge him with failure to grasp its exact significance and the real nature of the issues at stake. Mr. Russell is clearly right in finding the source of the worst contradictions in Leibnitz in the inconsistency between his view of judgment and his assumptions that the ego is a substance and the external world real, but the contradiction arises precisely because Leibnitz did *not* maintain an "existential" view of judgment. The difficulty in fact is to see how, in the Leibnitian theory, *any* judgment can assert real existence. The length at which I have discussed the fundamental logical problem suggested by the author's line of argument compels me to abstain from referring in detail to the numerous other topics of interest with which he deals. I will therefore only add that the account of Leibnitz's principle of Sufficient Reason is of special value, as it enables the English reader (again, I believe for the first time) to distinguish Leibnitz's great teleological postulate from the jejune variety of the common causal axiom which is frequently confounded with it.

A. E. TAYLOR.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

PROBLEMS OF EVOLUTION. By F. W. Headley. London: Duckworth, 1900. Pp. xv, 373.

In this book Mr. Headley, who is well known to ornithologists as the author of a valuable study on the Structure and Life of Birds, attempts to find a solution of some of the most difficult